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ABSTRACT   This paper uses an analytical frame comprised of agency theory and a resource based 
perspective to explore the influence of boards of directors on listed companies’ voluntary disclosure of 
information concerning intellectual capital [IC]. The IC disclosures in 75 published company reports 
of 15 listed Portuguese companies in a five year period of financial crisis, 2007 to 2011, are 
investigated using content analysis and regression techniques. IC disclosures are found to increase 
with company size, dual corporate governance models, industry, listing on sustainability indexes, and 
increases in board size up to a maximum point (beyond which disclosures decrease). IC disclosures are 
reduced by CEO duality and by a higher proportion of independent directors on boards. The year of 
reporting is not significant, suggesting that the period of financial crisis did not influence the level of 
IC disclosures. The evidence adduced is consistent with a view that highly visible companies 
acknowledge the importance of IC disclosures in maintaining their reputation and competitive 
advantage, even during a period of financial crisis. This paper highlights the need for caution in 
believing that adding extra directors to an existing board will lead to improved disclosure outcomes. 
Additionally, given the token number of females appointed to boards currently, the Portuguese capital 
market regulator should consider enforcing measures to ensure compliance with EU objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual capital [IC] has had an increasingly important influence on long term corporate value in the 
knowledge economy. Consistent with Meritum (2002) and Oliveira et al. (2010), we conceive IC as: 
... the value-creating combination of a company’s human capital (skills, experience, competence and innovation 
ability of personnel), structural capital (organizational processes and systems, software and databases and 
business processes), and relational capital (all resources linked to the external relationships of the firm with 
stakeholders, such as customers, creditors, investors, suppliers, etc.).  
Similarly, the European Commission (2006, p. 31) defines IC as the combination of the human, 
organizational and relational resources and activities of an organization – by which it includes the 
knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities of employees; R&D activities, organizational routines, 
procedures, systems, databases and intellectual property rights of the company; and all resources linked to 
the external relationships of the enterprise, such as with customers, suppliers, and R&D partners. 
 If stakeholders are informed fully of a firm’s management of IC, their ability to assess the firm’s 
capacity to sustain and increase long-term value will be enhanced. However, access to information regarding 
IC is asymmetric. Most stakeholders are disadvantaged in terms of access to information and are forced to 
rely strongly on voluntary disclosures of information about IC to inform their decision making. 
In this paper we report findings which update, reinforce and extend prior studies of the effect of 
corporate governance factors on levels of disclosure of IC items (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 
2008; Hidalgo et al., 2011). Gul and Leung (2004, p. 355) suggest that the ‘failure to include corporate 
governance characteristics could account for the inconsistent results [in prior studies] since corporate 
disclosure policies emanate from the board.’ As with Hidalgo et al. (2011), we seek to improve 
understanding of the corporate governance variables that are likely to reduce information asymmetry. We 
focus on voluntary disclosures of information about IC items.  
Currently, knowledge of the factors influencing voluntary disclosure of IC information by companies is 
incomplete. This study makes a distinctive contribution by focusing on governance issues in the context of 
the Portuguese financial crisis, 2007-2011; by framing its analysis in terms of agency theory and a resources-
based perspective [RBP]; and by exploring voluntary IC disclosures in a wider catchment of published 
reports than usual (that is, in company annual reports, sustainability reports, and/or a combination of both).1 
Although Manolopoulou and Tzelepis (2014) concluded that IC reporting significantly decreased during the 
period of crisis in Greece, our evidence reveals that Portuguese companies maintained their level of IC 
reporting, apparently to maintain their reputation and competitive advantage. We also analyse levels of 
female board membership and explore whether the gender diversity of boards influences IC disclosures.2  
Our results improve understanding of how financial crisis affects disclosure practices related to IC 
information, especially the influence of the composition of boards of directors on disclosures. They also help 
to assess the impact of recent corporate governance regulations in Portugal on IC disclosures. Portugal is an 
ideal setting to explore these matters for two reasons: first, because it was one of the European Union [EU] 
members most affected by the Global Financial Crisis [GFC]; and second, because the decision to require 
greater female participation on boards of Portuguese companies represents a deep cultural change.3  
Our findings suggest that even in a period of financial crisis, companies understand the importance of 
maintaining levels of IC disclosure in building a positive image of innovation and concern for IC matters. As 
with Hidalgo et al. (2011), we find a quadratic relationship between board size and IC disclosure. Thus, an 
increase in the number of directors is related positively to the level of IC disclosure until a maximum is 
reached, beyond which any increase in directors does not increase the level of IC disclosure. Similarly, we 
also find CEO duality is statistically significant at the 10% level in explaining voluntary disclosure of IC 
items. Importantly, we provide new evidence of a statistically significant negative correlation between levels 
of IC disclosure and the proportion of independent board members; and of the absence of a statistically 
significant relationship between the gender diversity of a board and levels of IC disclosure. 
The average size of boards of directors of listed companies in Portugal has grown in response to the 
Portuguese Securities Exchange Commission’s requirement that at least one quarter of boards of listed 
companies be comprised by independent directors (Instituto Português de Corporate Governance [IPCG], 
2006). In effect, this requirement implies that non-independent directors be replaced by independent 
                                                          
1 The International Integrated Reporting Council [IIRC] (2011) argues that integrating annual reports and sustainability reports 
into a combined report will build understanding of how performance in one area drives value in another. 
2 Recently, a European Union [EU] report required publicly listed companies in Europe to commit voluntarily to increase the 
presence of women on their corporate boards to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020, by actively recruiting qualified women to replace 
outgoing male members (EC, 2012). 
3 Salazar’s dictatorship in Portugal (1932 to 1968) shaped Portugal as a very ‘masculine’ country. In Salazar’s era, Portuguese 
society was very conservative. Women had little or no access to senior positions in government or business and their employment 
was restricted mainly to manual work and domestic duties (Nogueira et al., 1995). 
directors. In view of this, it is surprising to find that higher proportions of independent directors had a 
negative influence on IC disclosures. We draw attention to the small number of females on boards of listed 
companies in Portugal, and to whether the EU’s targeted representation levels for 2020 will be attained. We 
reveal that more IC information is disclosed by companies in high intangibles intensive industries, by 
companies with high visibility and reputation (as measured by size and listing in sustainability indexes), and 
by companies with a dual corporate governance model. 
In the following section we explain the corporate regulatory context of Portugal, review relevant 
literature, and develop research hypotheses. Thereafter, we explain our research design, sample selection, 
and dependent and independent variables. We then present results, before entering conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
PORTUGUESE CORPORATE REGULATORY CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES 
Portuguese regulatory context 
The Portuguese Stock Exchange is small by international standards. There are many listed family companies 
(Oliveira et al., 2010). Traditionally, the ownership of Portuguese companies is concentrated highly (Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007). Many companies are financed strongly by family owners and banks (Caria and 
Rodrigues, 2014). There is strong concern within the Portuguese business community about the extensive 
financial disclosure requirements imposed by the Securities Market Commission (Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários–CMVM) (Oliveira et al., 2010).  
From January 2005 onwards, compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] 
became compulsory for Portuguese listed companies in preparing consolidated accounts. From 1 January 
2010, the Portuguese government imposed an IFRS-based system (Sistema de Normalização contabilística - 
Accounting Standardization system) on all unlisted companies. The income tax code was adapted to be more 
amenable to the new accounting rules. Listed companies were permitted to apply IFRS from 2010 onwards 
in separate financial statements (Guerreiro et al., 2012). 
The first Portuguese corporate governance code, issued by the CMVM in 1999 (CMVM, 1999), was 
motivated by publication of the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (OECD, 1999). The 
Portuguese Code required listed companies to disclose information related to various aspects of corporate 
governance. In 2007, a major amendment to the corporate governance code required boards of directors to 
include sufficient non-executive members to ensure effective supervision, monitoring and evaluation of 
executive members’ activities (CMVM, 2007). At least one quarter of directors were required to be non-
executive directors. The CMVM also recommended that boards of directors rotate responsibility for the 
finance area among directors at least every two complete terms of office. There was no recommendation 
related to the gender composition of boards. 
In 2006, the IPCG recommended that the positions of CEO and Chair be held by different persons (Silva 
et al., 2006). If the Chair and CEO was the same person, the IPCG recommended that companies explain in 
their annual report how the work of non-executive directors was coordinated. The IPCG’s study of corporate 
governance practices in Portugal concluded that: 
 the average size of boards of directors had increased since 1996 due to the inclusion of 
independent non-executive directors, and the trend to establish an Executive Committee for the 
day-to-day running of a company. 
  the main purpose of companies must be to create wealth and to distribute it equally among 
shareholders.  
 the annual general meeting of shareholders should approve a company’s policies relating to 
sustainable development and social responsibility. 
 audit committee independence should be strengthened, particularly in view of the lack of 
assurance that audit committees were independent of executive directors. 
Portugal was affected severely by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The Portuguese economy 
suffered a pronounced on-going recession, featuring persistently high unemployment. The recession 
increased the level of debt rapidly, despite efforts to reduce public spending through government-
imposed austerity measures. Additionally, Portugal has many gender-based inequalities. These are 
evident in aspects of management power and leadership, both in companies and in government bodies 
(Nogueira et al., 1995). 
 
Development of hypotheses 
According to agency theory, a board of directors should monitor managers to ensure they behave in the 
interests of shareholders (Bertoni et al., 2014). In fulfilling this role, a board of directors serves as a value-
protection mechanism. According to the RBP view of corporate endeavour, a board of directors should help 
a company attain valuable resources to facilitate its competitive advantage. This role includes giving 
strategic advice, contributing to the company’s reputation, and expanding the company’s business contacts. 
Adoption of an RBP view emphasizes several matters: the value-creation capacity of a board of directors; 
that intangible resources and capabilities are the most important sources of company success; and that 
intangible resources are created, enhanced or depleted through relationships with stakeholders (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006). 
Asymmetry exists between what is known inside a company and what is known outside a company. 
Corporate reputations are sometimes more important than the true state of affairs in shaping the way external 
actors engage with companies (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). IC disclosures are an information signal with 
the capacity to influence the way stakeholders assess corporate reputation under conditions of incomplete 
information. In this regard, IC disclosures can be particularly important in assisting a company to develop 
competitive advantage by creating a positive image (for example, of a modern and competitive company), 
thereby encouraging people “to do business with the firm and buy its products” (Hooghiemstra, 2000, p. 64). 
Companies which invest in IC activities to create positive reputation often fail to realise the value of that 
reputation unless they make associated disclosures about their activities (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 
2005). Disclosures about IC activities help to build a positive image with external stakeholders and 
employees. These perceptions are also interrelated since employees’ assessments of how external 
stakeholders will react to their employer will influence their job satisfaction and employment intentions 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). 
We seek to understand how the composition of a board of directors explains why listed companies 
disclose IC information in published reports. We do so in respect of Portugal during a period of financial 
crisis. We are especially interested in exploring argument that it is important to understand whether the 
effect of internal governance mechanisms on voluntary corporate disclosures is complementary or 
substitutive (Cerboni and Parbonetti, 2007). If it is complementary, agency theory predicts increased 
disclosure since the adoption of more governance mechanisms will strengthen a company’s monitoring 
environment. If the relationship is substitutive, managers could decide to disclose less information to avoid 
competitive disadvantage by disclosing strategic information (Dye, 2001). Cerboni and Parbonetti (2007) 
argued that although results have been mixed and controversial, because of strong demand for product 
development information by technology analysts and science-based companies, firms seek to satisfy this 
demand by disclosing value-relevant information.  
Thus, we contend that corporate governance mechanisms have a positive impact on corporate 
disclosures. We begin by exploring the explanatory potential of corporate governance characteristics, 
canvassed in a diverse body of scholarly literature, to explain motivators for voluntary disclosure of 
information by listed companies. These characteristics include board size, board activity, CEO duality, 
independent directors, gender representation, and corporate governance model. The reasons for choosing 
these factors are discussed below. Related hypotheses are developed.  
 
 
Board size 
Board size has a significant influence on the efficiency, effectiveness and supervision of management 
(Hidalgo et al., 2011). Allegrini and Greco (2013) found a positive association between board size and levels 
of voluntary disclosure. Some prior studies have suggested that large boards are less effective at mitigating 
agency conflicts than smaller ones (Babío and Muíño, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), although 
opinion is often expressed cautiously:  
… larger boards may be beneficial because they increase the pool of expertise and resources available to the organisation 
but, as the number of members on the board increases, this benefit may be offset by the incremental costs of poorer 
communication and increased decision making time that are often associated with large groups (Hidalgo et al., 2011, p. 
486).  
 
Several studies have reported a quadratic relationship between board size and economic performance 
(e.g., Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Veprauskaitė and Adams, 2013; López and Morrós, 2014), between board 
size and corporate social disclosure (Cormier et al., 2011), and between board size and disclosures of IC 
information (Hidalgo et al., 2011). These studies have found, in effect, an inverted “U” relationship, with 
optimal board size existing at the midpoint (Cormier et al., 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2011). Increases in board 
size have been found to improve the marginal rate of disclosure up to the top of the inverted “U”, but then 
the marginal rate of disclosure diminishes as the size of the board becomes larger, and possibly unwieldy. 
This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H1a: Board size is related positively to voluntary disclosures of IC information. 
H1b: Board size is related positively to voluntary disclosures of IC information, up to an optimal 
board size. Board size beyond an optimal point is related negatively to voluntary disclosures of IC 
information. 
 
Independent directors 
The Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework (EC, 2011a) argues that boards will benefit 
from non-executive members who possess diverse views, skills and professional experience. The Green 
Paper recommends that independent non-executive board members be selected on the basis of “merit, 
professional qualifications, experience, personal qualities […] independence and diversity” (p. 5). These 
characteristics accord with the value-creation mechanisms of a board of directors that are emphasised by a 
RBP.  
Board of director effectiveness in protecting shareholders is associated positively with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, Eng and Mak (2003) and Gul and Leung (2004) have found a substitution effect: that an 
increase in independent directors reduces the need to disclose more information, and that increased 
monitoring by independent directors results in a lower level of voluntary disclosure. Although Hidalgo et al. 
(2011) did not find any significant relationship between the number of independent directors and disclosures 
of information about IC, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found a significant positive relationship. Given the 
possibility of a substitution effect, our hypothesis H2 is non-directional. 
 
H2: The proportion of independent members on a board of directors is related to voluntary disclosures 
of information about IC. 
Board activity 
Boards of directors which meet more frequently than others are argued to be more diligent and to monitor 
management more effectively (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Xie et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) reported a positive relationship between number of board meetings and voluntary 
disclosures of information. Thus, an active board of directors is likely to provide more effective management 
control of IC, and disclose more information about IC, to publicise work undertaken.  
 
H3. The number of meetings of a board of directors is related positively to voluntary disclosure of 
information about IC. 
CEO duality 
A common requirement of corporate governance regulation internationally is to separate the role of chair of 
the board from that of CEO. Agency theory suggests that combining the two roles enables the CEO to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour because of his/her dominance of the board (Barako et al., 2006). Since 
one of a board’s most important roles is to oversee top management’s performance, allowing the CEO to 
serve concurrently as chair compromises desired checks and balances, and reduces the probability that the 
board will execute its oversight and governance role properly (Lorsh and MacIver, 1989). Forker (1992) and 
Gul and Leung (2004) have reported a negative relationship between voluntary information disclosure and 
“CEO duality” (that is, in circumstances where one person assumes the roles of CEO and of chair of the 
board of directors). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) reported that concentration of power through CEO 
duality is associated negatively with IC disclosures, whereas Hidalgo et al., (2011) found no such 
relationship. 
 
H4: CEO duality is related negatively to voluntary disclosures of information about IC. 
 
Gender composition 
Gender diversity in the membership of a board of directors yields a broader range of competencies and 
expertise. Gender composition is considered important in enhancing the collective intelligence of a board of 
directors in the EU Corporate Governance Framework (EC, 2011a).4 Arguments for the appointment of 
female non-executive directors are that this will increase diversity of opinion, enhance decision making and 
leadership styles, and provide a competitive advantage by improving company image with stakeholder 
groups (Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Carter et al., 2003).  
Barako and Brown (2008) found that the representation of women on boards of Kenyan banks is 
associated positively with the extent of corporate social reporting information disclosed in annual reports. 
Nalikka (2009), in a study of 108 annual reports for 2005 to 2007 of companies listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange, concluded that “gender diversity is one of the attributes influencing the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports.” Specifically, she found a statistically significant association between 
companies with female Chief Financial Officers and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. As 
well, a wide variety of empirical research reports that gender diversity improves company performance (for 
example, Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). We draw on such prior findings to argue that gender diversity should 
have a positive impact on disclosure. 
  
H5: The proportion of women directors on the board is related positively to the voluntary disclosure of 
information about IC. 
 
Corporate governance model 
The governance structure of Portuguese companies has changed in recent years. In 1999, companies 
followed either: 
 the Latin model of corporate governance (Board of Directors and an Audit Board (which could be 
one person) or  
 the Continental model (Supervisory Board and a Management Board. The latter was responsible for 
arranging a statutory audit).  
In 2006, the revised Companies Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais, CSC) allowed Portuguese 
companies to adopt more advanced models of corporate governance: they could choose between a Latin 
                                                          
4 A Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Working Paper (EC, 2011b), titled “The Gender Balance in Business Leadership”, 
reported the average proportion of females on (supervisory) boards of listed companies in the EU was only 12%. 
model, a Continental model, and an Anglo-Saxon model. The Anglo-Saxon model comprised a board of 
directors, an audit committee, and a statutory auditor – all elected at a company’s annual general meeting. 
The audit committee is to be composed exclusively of non-executive directors, but with at least one member 
having sound knowledge of accounting and auditing. The CSC regarded the Anglo-Saxon model to be a 
more advanced model of corporate governance, and one likely to increase a company’s legitimacy and 
reputation with many stakeholders (Costa et al., 2013). Companies adopting this model were thought likely 
to disclose more IC information than companies which adopted either of the other models.  
H6. Companies adopting the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance are more likely to disclose 
IC information than companies which adopt either of the classical (Latin or Continental) models 
of corporate governance. 
 
Control Variables 
We selected company size, industry, listing on sustainability indexes, ownership concentration, and reporting 
year, as control variables.  
Several previous studies have found that firm size influences voluntary disclosure (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Meek et al., 1995; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Hidalgo et al., 2011).  
Consistent with previous research in Portugal (Oliveira et al., 2006; 2010), we partitioned companies 
into “high intangibles intensive” and “low intangibles intensive.” High intangibles industries include 
chemicals, electronics, technology, telecommunications and finance. Our sample included six “high 
intangibles intensive” companies and nine “low intangibles intensive” companies.  
We include listing on sustainability indexes as a proxy for reputation, consistent with Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2012). This variable was included in studies by Dragomir (2010), Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2011), 
and Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009).  
Prior empirical research on the association between voluntary corporate disclosures and ownership 
concentration has reported mixed results. However, most studies have found an inverse relationship between 
these variables (for example, Gul and Leung, 2004; Firer and Williams, 2005; Barako et al., 2006).  
The variable “year” controls for the effects of the financial crisis on IC disclosure. A study by Ahmed 
and Mohd (2012) of major listed Malaysian companies, 2008 to 2010, showed a significant increasing trend 
over time in the human capital disclosure index. However, Manolopoulou and Tzelepis (2014) found that IC 
reporting significantly decreased during the period of crisis in Greece. There are plausible grounds to believe 
that companies would reduce disclosure levels in a financial crisis: for example, to save costs. Indeed, the 
turmoil of a financial crisis could cause companies become more focused on operational efficiency rather 
than on stakeholder impression management, and legitimacy-seeking through voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample  
We sample annual reports, sustainability reports, and reports which are a combination of both of these types 
of reports, for 2007 to 2011, for companies listed on the Lisbon Stock Exchange at 31 December 2012. 
Initially, we intended to sample all companies comprising the PSI 20 index.5 However, because some PSI 20 
companies did not include information on corporate social responsibility (CSR), we included other 
companies that were not part of the index in 2012, but had been so in the period 2007 – 2011 (and had 
reported information on CSR). The latter step seems justifiable in view of the large overlap of CSR and IC 
indicators found by Cordazzo (2005), Pedrini (2007) and Oliveira et al. (2010). We are mindful of the 
potential to understate IC disclosure levels if sustainability reports and annual reports were not both 
considered.  
We selected 15 companies that were included on the PSI 20 index during the five years of this study. 
These companies, and the industries to which they belong, are listed in Appendix A. Reports were accessed 
on each company’s website. We used pooled data with 75 firm-year observations: that is, 15 companies for 5 
years each. The companies were from the following industries: Basic Materials (n = 1); Consumer Services 
                                                          
5 The PSI 20 is a benchmark stock market index of companies trading on Euronext Lisbon. It tracks the prices of the twenty largest 
listings according to market capitalization and share turnover in the general market of the Lisbon Stock Exchange.  
(n = 2); Financial (n = 4); Industrial (n = 3); Oil and Energy (n = 1); Telecommunications (n = 2); and 
Utilities (n = 2).  
 
Variables and data collection 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable was an IC disclosure index (ICI). This was constructed using content analysis 
(Guthrie et al., 2004; Beattie & Thomson, 2007). Such a method allows repeatability and valid inferences 
from data according to the context (Krippendorf, 1980). The content analysis technique involves codifying 
information into pre-defined categories to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of information 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). It analyses published information systematically, objectively and reliably 
(Krippendorf, 1980). This method has been used in previous studies of disclosure of information (Guthrie et 
al., 2004; Bukh et al., 2005; García-Meca et al., 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Singh and Van der 
Zahn, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
We assumed all items were relevant to all firms and were calculable by them. Thus, the total score of 
ICI for a company is: 
ICI = 
m
d
m
i
i
1
   
where   
di = 0, if the disclosure item is not found  
di = 1, if the disclosure item is found 
  m = the maximum number of items a company can disclose  
ICI = Intellectual Capital Index (of disclosure) 
We pilot tested three randomly chosen reports to obtain a list that better reflected the diverse nature of 
disclosed items. The final list included 88 IC items that firms could disclose (Strategy – 22; Processes – 10; 
Innovation, Research and Development [IRD] – 8; Technology – 5; Customers – 14; Human Capital – 29) 
(see Table 1). The data disclosures identified in our content analysis of the full sample were coded manually 
since software-assisted searches for words or sentences are insufficiently robust to capture the nature of IC 
disclosures (Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2010). Content analysis of the entire sample was 
performed by the first author, informed by her prior coding of an initial sample of four annual reports with 
the second author. An inter-coder reliability test revealed the scale of coding errors (Scott’s pi = 85.1%) to 
be “an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability” (Hackston and Milne 1996, p. 87). 
Independent Variables 
The hypotheses tested included independent variables for board size, proportion of independent directors, 
board activity, CEO duality, board composition as measured by the presence of female directors, and 
governance model. We proceeded consistent with studies by Barako et al. (2006), Cerbioni and Parbonetti 
(2007), Lim et al. (2007), Barako and Brown (2008), Li et al. (2008), Prado and García (2010), Hidalgo et 
al. (2011), and Allegrini and Greco (2013). Our independent variables were: 
 
Board size: number of members of the board of directors.  
Independent directors: percentage of independent directors comprising the board of directors. 
Board activity: number of meetings of the board of directors during a financial year. 
CEO duality: dummy variable with a value of 1 in case of CEO duality, and 0 otherwise. 
Gender composition: percentage of females on the board of directors.  
Governance model: dummy variable with a value of 1 if the Anglo Saxon model is used, and 0 if the 
Latin or dual Continental model is used.  
Control Variables 
Company size: logarithm of the number of employees (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005) 
Industry: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company belongs to a high intangibles intensive 
industry, and 0 otherwise (Oliveira et al., 2006; 2010). 
Listing on sustainability indexes: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company is included in 
sustainability indexes (e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) or FTSE4Good), and 0 otherwise 
(Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Dragomir 2010; Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2011).  
Ownership concentration: proportion of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholders (with equity 
of 5% or more) (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007).  
Year: four dummy variables were included in the model to control for the effects of year of publication 
(0 = reference year = 2007; 1 = Y2 = 2008; 2 = Y3 = 2009; 3 = Y4 = 2010; and 4 = Y5 2011) (Costa et 
al., 2013). 
 
Research models 
The four econometric models we used are based on linear regression techniques. They test hypotheses H1 to 
H6, consistent with approaches in prior disclosure studies by García-Meca et al. (2005), Oliveira et al. 
(2010) and Hidalgo et al. (2011). We developed a pooled regression (or data pool) estimate using an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach, in accord with similar studies (for example, by Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006). We began by analysing the independent variables in Models 1 and 2. To control for any 
nonlinear relationship between board size and the level of IC disclosures, we also considered the square of 
the LnBoardSize variable (model 2). We also considered the square of the board size variable in Models 3 
and 4. Our logarithmic transformation of variables for board size, and board activity avoids potential 
problems of heteroscedasticity, facilitates data interpretation, and improves the quality of results (Haniffa 
and Hudaib 2006; La Rosa and Liberatore, 2014). In Model 3 we considered the independent and control 
variables. To control the unobservable events common to all companies for yearly differences, dichotomous 
variables (time dummies for each year) were incorporated into Model 4, consistent with Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) and Cardamone et al. (2012). 
Model 1 
ICI = β0 + β1LnBoardSizeit + β2IndependentDirectorsit + β3LnBoardActivityit + β4CEO dualityit + 
β5Genderit + β6GovernanceModel Dummies + ε                         
Model 2 
ICI = β0 + β1LnBoardSizeit + β2(LnBoardSize)2it + β3IndependentDirectorsit + β4LnBoardActivityit + 
β5CEO dualityit + β6Genderit + β7GovernanceModel Dummies + ε   
Model 3 
ICI = β0 + β1LnBoardSizeit + β2(LnBoardSize)2it + β3IndependentDirectorsit + β4LnBoardActivityit + 
β5CEOdualityit + β6Genderit + β7GovernanceModel Dummies + β8Ln Size it + β9Industryit + β10Listing on 
sustainability indexesit + β11Ownership concentration it + ε                                                                                                                                  
Model 4 
ICI = β0 + β1LnBoardSizeit + β2 (LnBoardSize)2it + β3IndependentDirectorsit + β4LnBoardActivityit + 
β5CEO dualityit + β6Genderit + β7GovernanceModel Dummies + β8Ln Sizeit + β9Industryit + β10Listing on 
sustainability indexesit + β11Ownership concentration it + Year Dummies + ε                                                                                                                
where: 
LnBoardSize   = natural logarithm of the Board 
LnBoardSize2   = square of the natural logarithm of the Board Size  
LnBoardActivity  = natural logarithm of the Board Activity 
GovernanceModel  = two dummies (Latin and dual) 
Ln Size   = natural logarithm of the number of employees 
Year    = four dummies (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of regression models using the robust option of STATA 12.1 software for 
estimating standard errors.  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 reports the frequency with which the 88 items in the ICI were disclosed. Generally, there was a high 
incidence of disclosure. Fifty-six items were disclosed in more than 75% of the 75 company year 
observations. However, 11 ICI items were disclosed in fewer than 25% of the 75 observations. These were 
principally disclosures relating to patents, customers, and employee training and experience. 
------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------- 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the data reported in Table 1. It reveals the levels of disclosure 
for the ICI overall, and for its six sub-indexes. The ICI scores per company ranged from 0.557 to 0.875. On 
average, the annual report and the sustainability report (or combined report) disclosed information in respect 
of 72.8 per cent of the total disclosure items, with a standard deviation of 7.3%. In terms of sub-indexes, the 
three highest average levels were for Strategy (91%), Processes (80%) and Human Capital (76%). The three 
lowest average levels were for Technology (63%), Innovation, Research and Development (40%), and 
Customers (55%). These results are consistent with previous studies by García-Meca et al. (2005) and 
Oliveira et al. (2010). As with Oliveira et al. (2010), the standard deviation for the Innovation, Research and 
Development category was also the highest (0.275).  
-------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables. Board size ranged from 
6 to 30, with a mean of 15.6. In 1994 the mean board size was 9; in 1999 it was 11; and in 2004 it was 15 
(Silva et al., 2006). The increasing size of the board is associated mainly with regulatory pressures to include 
non-executive directors. The size of the board in Portugal is similar to that found in other Continental 
European countries, but it is larger than in UK (9) or US (11) (Silva et al., 2006). On average, 27.7% of 
directors were classified as independent. This complies with the Portuguese Corporate Governance Code 
requirement that at least one quarter of directors be independent.  
On average, the boards met 12 times per year. Females comprised only about 4% of members, although 
this number is increasing gradually.6 In 77% of observations, the roles of the CEO and board chair were 
separate, in accord with Portuguese corporate governance regulations. In Portugal, the Anglo-Saxon model 
                                                          
6 In 2012, women represented 7.4% of the board members of the twenty largest listed companies in Portugal. This was 
significantly less than the average of 15.8% in the EU. The rate of increase of women on boards between 2003 and 2012 was 0.4 
percentage points per annum. “At this rate of change, boards with at least 40% of each gender would not be seen for at least 75 
years.” (EC, 2013). 
of corporate governance was more dominant (45%). The Latin governance model was important too (41%). 
The dual model was not significant (13%). There was a high level of ownership concentration: 61% of 
ordinary shares were held in individual shareholdings of 5% or more. Forty per cent of the companies 
belonged to high intangibles intensive industries. Seventy-three per cent of observations were not included in 
any sustainability index, while 27% were part of at least one index. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 Bivariate analysis 
The bivariate analysis results in Table 4 reveal ICI is correlated positively with board size, board activity, 
listing on sustainability indexes, and the dual governance model; and correlated negatively with CEO 
duality. The results are similar from year to year. These bivariate relationships are consistent with the results 
obtained in previous studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Barako and Brown, 2008; 
Li et al., 2008; Dragomir 2010; Oliveira et al., 2010; Prado and García, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). 
---------------------------------- 
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Independent directors are more likely to be found in larger companies that adopt the Anglo-Saxon or 
dual corporate governance models, and to have lower levels of ownership concentration. Board activity is 
correlated positively with board size, listing on sustainability indexes, adoption of a dual corporate 
governance model, and lower levels of ownership concentration. The percentage of females on boards of 
directors is very low. Gender is not a significant factor. However, more females on boards are found in 
companies with lower levels of ownership concentration.  
Companies which adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance typically belong to 
sustainability indexes, have a large board of directors, and low levels of ownership concentration. 
Companies with the Continental corporate governance model are bigger, have a higher proportion of 
independent directors, larger boards, and higher levels of ownership concentration than companies which 
adopt the Latin model of corporate governance.  
The correlation coefficients do not indicate collinearity. No pair-wise correlation coefficient is greater 
than 0.80 (Gujarati, 1995, p. 335). 
 
Multivariate analysis 
We validated the models using specification tests. To verify whether the models had omitted variables, the 
Ramsey Reset test was performed. To detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals (prediction 
errors) from a regression analysis, we applied the Durbin-Watson test. The overall significance of the models 
was assessed using an F-test. The models were significant globally at the 1 per cent level (F-test=5.331, 
5.23, 5.555 and 4.021, respectively). 
For Model 1, the only significant variable was board activity at the 5% level (β3 = 0.033, t = 2.41). This 
is consistent with results reported by Allegrini and Greco (2013) for a study of non-financial companies 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 2007. Board size is not significant (β1 = 0.038, t = 1.29) − a result 
similar to of Cheng and Courtenay (2006). The latter authors found no association between the level of 
disclosure and board size. They argued that large boards lead to a decrease in monitoring capabilities. 
When we included the variable (LnBoardSize)2 in Model 2, board size was also significant (5% level). 
The coefficient of the LnBoardSize variable was positive (β1= 0.446) and the variable (LnBoardSize)2 was 
negative (β2= -0.087). That is, the quadratic term of the proposed model resulted in a curve represented by 
an inverse "U", where the number of directors is related positively with the level of disclosure of IC up to a 
certain maximum, beyond which the level of disclosure of IC information decreases. Thus, board size 
increases IC disclosures up to a maximum point, beyond which board size is related negatively to ICI. This 
is consistent with Cormier et al. (2011) and Hidalgo et al. (2011). 
In Model 2, the variable CEO duality is related negatively (10% level) to IC disclosure. Thus, when the 
CEO is also the Chair, disclosure of IC is reduced. These results accord with Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), 
Barako (2008), Li et al. (2008), Hidalgo et al. (2011) and Allegrini and Greco (2013). 
When control variables are added (Model 3), ICI is related positively and significantly to board size at 
the 0.1% level (β1 = 1.055, t = 3.93; β2 = -0.204, t = -3.97; respectively), board activity at the 10 per cent 
level (β4 = 0.029, t = 1.91) and the dual governance model at the 5% level (β7 = 0.120, t = 2.23). Moreover, 
ICI is related negatively to independent directors at the 5% level (β3 = -0.148, t = -2.22), corroborating the 
findings of Eng and Mak (2003) and Gul and Leung (2004). Firm size (5%), industry (1%) and listing on 
sustainability indexes (0.1%) are also related positively to ICI, in accord with results obtained by Eng and 
Mak (2003); Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007); Dragomir (2010); Oliveira et al., (2010); and Hidalgo et al., 
(2011). The year of reporting (Model 4) is not statistically significant: the level of disclosure was similar 
over the period 2007-2011. The financial crisis in that period does not seem to have influenced levels of 
disclosure of IC. 
---------------------------------- 
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We used Model 4 to test for the relationship between ICI and all sub-indexes (see Table 6). The Ramsey 
Reset test indicates that Model 4 is well specified only in the case of the following sub-indexes: Strategy, 
Processes, and Human Capital. Disclosures in the sub-indexes for Innovation, Technology, and Customers 
do not seem to be explained by governance or firm characteristics.  
Strategy disclosures are related positively to size and the Latin corporate governance model (both at the 
5% level), and board activity (at 10%); and they are related negatively to CEO duality (at 10%). Disclosures 
in the sub-index Processes are related positively to board size and industry (both at 1%), and listing on 
sustainability indexes (at 10%); and they are related negatively to gender (at 5%). Finally, disclosures in the 
sub-index Human Capital are related positively to board size (at the 0.1% level), to listing on a sustainability 
index (at 5%), and industry (at 10%); and they are related negatively to independent directors (at 5%).  
---------------------------------- 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Recent regulatory initiatives in Portugal and elsewhere in the EU regarding corporate governance are 
motivated, implicitly at least, by belief that beneficial disclosures of corporate information would flow from 
mandating a more heterogeneously composed board of directors ─ in particular, boards that include more 
females and a substantial proportion of independent directors.  
Our results are inconclusive with respect to the idea that increased gender diversity will increase IC 
disclosure (H5). As well, they point to the need for caution in believing that simply adding extra external 
independent directors to an existing board will improve disclosure outcomes. In Portugal, increases in board 
size seem to be related more to the need to comply with corporate governance regulations to increase the 
number of external independent directors, than to desire to include more females on boards. Portuguese 
capital markets and Portuguese corporate governance regulations do not seem to have been influenced by the 
policy debate, in September 2010, when the EC adopted its Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 
(2010-2015) and announced “targeted initiatives to get more women into top jobs in decision-making” (EU, 
2012). It is timely to consider whether reluctance to appoint women to boards of directors has the potential 
to damage the financial situation and reputation of Portuguese companies.  
The White Book issued by the IPCG in 2006 noted that, in Portugal, there was no clear identification of 
directors who are truly independent from those who are non-independent. This is due to the absence of 
information allowing any clear connection to be established between the directors and the company’s main 
shareholders. Perhaps because of the absence of independence, our study reveals that independent directors 
influence IC disclosure negatively. Another explanation is the substitution effect detected by Eng and Mak 
(2003) and Gul and Leung (2004). From the perspective of agency theory, independent directors do not 
appear to monitor the behavior of managers to ensure managers operate in the interests of shareholders (H2).  
IC disclosure did not decrease between 2007 and 2011 − a period of deep financial crisis in Portugal. 
Our data reveal that this occurred independently of a company’s ownership concentration (please see Table 
4). This can be explained using a RBP view: one in which directors are conceived to have a role in helping a 
firm attain valuable resources to facilitate its competitive advantage. If that competitive advantage is lost 
because of a decrease in IC investment, this can reduce a company’s reputation (e.g., in terms of innovation). 
This seems attributable, in part, to directors being conscious of the possibility of damaging their firm’s 
image (associated, for example, with speculation about their financial situation).7 A plausible case can be 
made that they use disclosure as a means of legitimising the company’s existence − and to maintain or 
empower its image. This reveals the utility of a RBP view in analysing a company’s IC disclosures. The high 
visibility and reputation of the companies in our sample seems likely to have prompted them to maintain 
levels of IC disclosure to avoid reputational damage. Directors had an incentive to maintain IC disclosures 
so as to influence people to continue considering their company to be modern and competitive. 
The Portuguese setting reinforces previous research that has found a quadratic relationship between 
board size and IC disclosure (H1b). This finding implies that large boards should be avoided if IC 
disclosures are regarded as important. Although a board’s monitoring capacities increase with the number of 
directors, the costs involved (such as slower decision making and less candid discussions of managerial 
performance) could outweigh the benefits. This finding, and the results showing a negative relationship 
between IC disclosure and independent directors (H3), and CEO duality (H4), should interest the Portuguese 
CMVM in devising its future reform agenda. Additionally, given the token number of females appointed to 
boards at the moment, the CMVM should consider undertaking enforcement measures to ensure compliance 
with EU objectives. 
The level of board activity is related slightly to IC disclosure (H3). This is explainable by the fact that 
active boards have ample opportunities to convey information to society. Such information includes 
messages that a company is well managed, that stakeholders’ interests are taken into account, and that the 
board of directors is functioning well as a value-protection mechanism, thereby legitimising the company’s 
behavior. Our results confirm that IC disclosures are more likely to occur with the Continental governance 
model than with the Anglo Saxon model (contrary to the view of the CMVM). 
Company size is a proxy for company visibility. More visible companies which belong to high 
intangibles intensive industries and which are listed on sustainability indexes disclose more IC information. 
This accords with a resource-based perspective because it emphasizes the role of the board of directors in 
contributing to the firm’s image and reputation. 
                                                          
7 This was the case of Banco Espírito Santo. Although this bank declared bankruptcy at the end of 2013, it kept disclosures at the 
same level in the analysis period. 
It is important to continue researching how corporate governance characteristics influence IC disclosure. 
A particularly beneficial line of investigation would be to explore associations between IC disclosures and 
features of various sub-committees of a board of directors. As well, it would be beneficial if future research 
used larger samples, less visible companies, and companies in countries facing deep financial crises (e.g., 
Spain, Italy and France) to better understand whether levels of IC information disclosures are maintained 
during periods of financial crisis. Another line of future enquiry might be to explore family-held, publicly-
traded companies to assess the influence of the compositional dynamics of the board of directors of such 
companies on voluntary disclosures of IC. 
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Table 1. Frequency of intellectual capital items disclosed by firms 
 
Items 
Observations  
n = 75 
(%) 
2007-2011 
Strategy – 22 items   
1. Corporate governance 75 100 
2. New products or services and technology 73 97 
3. Investments in new business 73 97 
4. Strategic alliances or agreements 74 99 
5. Acquisitions and mergers 38 51 
6. Leadership 65 87 
7. Network of suppliers and distributors 73 97 
8. Supplier evaluation policy 66 88 
9. Image and brand 73 97 
10. Corporate culture 68 91 
11. Best practices 71 95 
12. Organisational structure 71 95 
13. Environmental investments 50 67 
14. Community involvement 74 99 
15. Corporate social responsibility and objective 74 99 
16. Shareholders’ structure 62 83 
17. Price policy 49 65 
18. Business vision, objectives and consistency of strategy 74 99 
19. Quality of products and or services 75 100 
20. Marketing activities 66 88 
21. Stakeholder relationships and or engagement 75 100 
22. Risk management 75 100 
Processes – 10 items   
 1.  Working environment, safety and hygiene 65 87 
 2. Internal sharing of knowledge and information 72 96 
 3. External sharing of knowledge and information 75 100 
 4. Measure of internal or external failures 40 53 
 5. Environmental approvals and statements and or policies 55 73 
 6. Utilisation of energy, raw materials, and other inputs 71 95 
 7. Efficiency 74 99 
 8. Business model 43 57 
 9. Litigations and or law suits and or sanctions 35 47 
10. Quality approvals and statements and or policies 68 91 
Innovation. research and development – 8 items   
 1. Policy, strategy and or objectives of IRD activities 74 99 
 2 IRD expenses 36 48 
 3 IRD in basic research 37 49 
 4. IRD in product design and or development 33 44 
 5. Future IRD projects or IRD projects in progress 35 47 
 6. Details of firm patents 10 13 
 7. Patents, licences, papers, etc. 8 11 
 8. Patents pending 5 7 
Technology – 5 items   
 1. Investments in information technology – description 71 95 
 2. Information technology systems and facilities 74 99 
 3. Software assets 55 73 
 4. Web transactions 34 45 
 5. Number of visits to the web 1 1 
Customers – 14 items   
 1. Number of customers 38 51 
 2. Sales by customer 7 9 
 3. Annual sales per segment or product 73 97 
 4. Average customer size 4 5 
5. Customer relationships 72 96 
6. Customer satisfaction and or survey 67 89 
7. Education and or training of customers 44 59 
8. Customers by employee 5 7 
9. Value added per customer or segment 1 1 
10. Market share by country and or segment and or product 63 84 
11. Relative market share to competitors 48 64 
12. Customer seniority and loyalty 40 53 
Items 
Observations  
n = 75 
(%) 
2007-2011 
13. Customer complaints 67 89 
14. New customers 53 71 
Human capital – 29 items   
1. Labour and unions 69 92 
2. Staff community involvement 45 60 
3. Staff entrepreneurship (new ideas) 54 72. 
4. Staff by age 69 92 
5. Staff by gender 69 92 
6. Staff by job function and or business area 64 85 
7. Staff by level of education 35 47 
 8. Staff by geographic area and or country 67 89 
 9. Staff by type of contract 66 88 
10. Staff turnover 63 84 
11. Changes in number of employees 66 88 
12. Staff health and safety 71 95 
13. Absenteeism 59 79 
14. Staff interview and or employee survey 57 76 
15. Policy on competence development 75 100 
16. Description of competence development programs and activities 75 100 
17. Education and training policy 72 96 
18. Education and training expenses  15 20 
19. Education and training hours ÷ number of employees 68 91 
20. Employee expenses ÷ number of employees 5 7 
21. Recruitment policies 66 88 
22. Job rotation opportunities 69 92 
23. Career opportunities 75 100 
24. Remuneration and evaluation systems 74 99 
25. Incentive systems and fringe benefits 67 89 
26. Pensions 60 80 
27. Value added per employee or production per employee 2 3 
28. Employee quality and experience 45 60 
29. Management quality and experience  33 44 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for ICI and sub-indexes  
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007-2011 
Intellectual Capital (ICI) 
      
mean 0.710 0.720 0.724 0.733 0.751 0.728 
sd 0.066 0.071 0.082 0.077 0.072 0.073 
max 0.841 0.830 0.864 0.875 0.875 0.875 
min 0.568 0.602 0.557 0.614 0.602 0.557 
Strategy – 22 items 
      
mean 0.903 0.918 0.885 0.903 0.918 0.905 
sd 0.071 0.062 0.080 0.087 0.083 0.076 
max 1.000 1.000 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 
min 0.773 0.818 0.727 0.727 0.682 0.682 
Processes – 10 items 
      
mean 0.747 0.807 0.787 0.807 0.840 0.797 
sd 0.119 0.110 0.113 0.139 0.130 0.123 
max 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
min 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.700 0.500 
Innovation, research and development – 8 items       
mean 0.392 0.350 0.383 0.408 0.450 0.397 
sd 0.291 0.251 0.273 0.301 0.287 0.275 
max 0.875 0.625 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
min 0.000 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.000 
Technology – 5 items       
mean 0.587 0.627 0.640 0.627 0.653 0.627 
sd 0.220 0.128 0.172 0.183 0.160 0.172 
max 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 
min 0.000 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.400 0.000 
Customers – 14 items 
      
mean 0.543 0.548 0.552 0.557 0.571 0.554 
sd 0.132 0.166 0.154 0.153 0.132 0.144 
max 0.714 0.786 0.714 0.857 0.857 0.857 
min 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.286 0.357 0.214 
Human capital – 29 items       
mean 0.740 0.743 0.772 0.770 0.779 0.761 
sd 0.090 0.076 0.086 0.102 0.101 0.090 
max 0.897 0.862 0.897 0.862 0.897 0.897 
min 0.586 0.517 0.586 0.517 0.517 0.517 
N (observations) 15 15 15 15 15 75 
 
  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent and control variables 
  
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007-2011 
Board size 
      mean 14.7 15 15.800 16.300 16.300 15.600 
sd 6.9 6.180 6.720 6.500 6.260 6.370 
max 30.0 26 27 27 25 30 
min 6.0 7 7 8 9 6 
Independent directors       
mean 0.273 0.264 0.300 0.258 0.292 0.277 
sd 0.148 0.139 0.141 0.137 0.131 0.136 
max 0.444 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.560 0.560 
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Board Activity       
mean 9.47 9.27 12.40 13.50 16.70 12.3 
sd 4.09 3.84 10.50 11.30 16.10 10.4 
max 18.00 18.00 48.00 50.00 58.00 58.00 
min 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Gender         
mean 0.035 0.026 0.033 0.042 0.062 0.0396 
sd 0.087 0.058 0.061 0.071 0.077 0.0707 
max 0.333 0.214 0.214 0.267 0.308 0.333 
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm size       
mean 12847 14450 15134 15849 18612 15378 
sd 12885 15089 16211 17491 22906 16882 
max 41300 53375 53977 61061 72046 72046 
min 802 793 738 728 734 728 
Ownership concentration        
mean 0.576 0.596 0.610 0.625 0.635 0.608 
sd 0.178 0.191 0.174 0.163 0.178 0.173 
max 0.777 0.812 0.770 0.844 0.844 0.844 
min 0.099 0.099 0.169 0.286 0.174 0.099 
N (observations) 15 15 15 15 15 75 
Panel B: Dummy Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
CEO duality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency 10 5 12 3 12 3 11 4 13 2 58 17 
Percentage (%) 67 33 80 20 80 20 73 27 87 13 77 23 
Latin or Continental governance       
Frequency 8 7 9 6 9 6 9 6 9 6 44 31 
Percentage (%) 53 47 60 40 60 40 60 40 60 40 59 41 
Anglo-Saxon governance       
Frequency 9 6 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 41 34 
Percentage (%) 60 40 53 47 53 47 5 47 53 47 55 45 
Dual governance       
Frequency 13 2 13 2 13 2 13 2 13 2 65 10 
Percentage (%) 87 13 87 13 87 13 87 13 87 13 87 13 
High intangibles intensive industries             
Frequency 9 6 9 6 9 6 9 6 9 6 45 30 
Percentage (%) 60 40 60 40 60 40 60 40 60 40 60 40 
Listing on sustainability indexes             
Frequency 12 3 11 4 11 4 11 4 10 5 55 20 
Percentage (%) 80 20 73 27 73 27 73 27 67 33 73 27 
N (observations) 15 15 15 15 15 75 
 
Table 4. Correlations (Pearson and Spearman) 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] 
[1] Intellectual Capital  1.00 0.57** 0.53** 0.73** 0.21 0.67** 0.64** 0.29* -0.10 0.32** -0.24* -0.02 0.13 0.12 0.27* -0.19 -0.18 0.27* 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.16 
[2] Strategy   0.60** 1.00 0.25* 0.34** -0.11 0.54** -0.03 -0.13 -0.16 0.11 -0.34** 0.06 0.24* -0.04 -0.21 -0.01 -0.42** 0.09 0.37** -0.02 0.08 -0.14 -0.02 0.08 
[3] Processes  0.52** 0.24* 1.00 0.35** -0.06 0.25* 0.21 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.21 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.17 
[4] Innovation 0.73** 0.42** 0.34** 1.00 -0.11 0.21 0.44** 0.16 -0.17 0.27* -0.06 0.11 0.12 -0.31** 0.31** 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.10 
[5] Technology   0.11 -0.21 -0.12 -0.19 1.00 0.37** 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.14 -0.05 0.11 0.23* 0.45** 0.26* -0.29* -0.08 0.21 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 
[6] Customers  0.68** 0.52** 0.29* 0.22 0.26* 1.00 0.10 0.17 -0.04 0.13 -0.46** -0.15 0.29* 0.40** 0.01 -0.29* -0.44** 0.36** 0.19 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06 
[7] Human capital  0.60** 0.04 0.13 0.44** 0.19 0.10 1.00 0.47** -0.03 0.34** 0.07 -0.03 -0.21 0.09 0.39** -0.19 0.17 0.29* -0.37** -0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.05 0.10 
[8] Board size (log) 0.24* -0.17 -0.07 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.50** 1.00 0.25* 0.33** -0.31** -0.07 0.24* 0.35** 0.55** -0.49** 0.32** 0.41** -0.60** -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.07 
[9] Independent directors  -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.11 1.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.46** -0.04 0.17 -0.44** 0.25* 0.28* -0.45** -0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.05 
[10] Board activity (log) 0.25* 0.07 0.02 0.28* 0.08 0.09 0.34** 0.32** -0.11 1.00 0.15 -0.10 0.01 0.08 0.25* -0.30** -0.13 0.44** -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 0.01 0.07 0.18 
[11] CEO duality  -0.26* -0.29* -0.07 -0.06 0.04 -0.42** 0.06 -0.27* -0.05 0.25* 1.00 -0.12 -0.44** -0.12 0.11 0.22 0.15 -0.21 0.00 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 
[12] Gender 0.06 0.06 -0.12 0.03 0.25* 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.09 -0.10 -0.28* 1.00 0.15 -0.10 -0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.16 
[13] Size (log) 0.06 0.18 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.19 -0.09 0.24* 0.55** -0.04 -0.41** 0.12 1.00 0.07 0.09 -0.53** 0.08 0.22 -0.24* -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
[14] Industry 0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.35** 0.46** 0.38** 0.06 0.34** -0.10 0.12 -0.12 0.06 0.04 1.00 0.12 -0.31** 0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[15] Listing on sustainability indexes 0.23 -0.09 0.06 0.29* 0.26* 0.03 0.42** 0.55** 0.16 0.21 0.11 -0.06 0.10 0.12 1.00 -0.34** 0.36** 0.12 -0.44** -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
[16] Ownership concentration  -0.04 0.08 0.17 0.05 -0.33** -0.20 -0.15 -0.42** -0.52** -0.09 0.19 -0.06 -0.68** -0.29* -0.46** 1.00 0.08 -0.80** 0.47** -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.08 
[17] Anglo-Saxon governance model -0.23 -0.38** 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.41** 0.17 0.34** 0.18 -0.05 0.15 -0.09 0.14 0.08 0.36** -0.11 1.00 -0.36** -0.76** -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
[18] Dual governance model 0.30** 0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.24* 0.41** 0.32** 0.37** 0.30** 0.29* -0.21 0.05 0.27* 0.08 0.12 -0.59** -0.36** 1.00 -0.33** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[19] Latin governance model 0.02 0.35** -0.01 0.04 -0.12 0.13 -0.39** -0.60** -0.39** -0.14 0.00 0.05 -0.33** -0.13 -0.44** 0.51** -0.76** -0.33** 1.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
[20] 2007 -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.12 0.02 -0.11 0.13 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 0.05 1.00 -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* 
[21] 2008 -0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.25* 1.00 -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* 
[22] 2009 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.25* -0.25* 1.00 -0.25* -0.25* 
[23] 2010 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* 1.00 -0.25* 
[24] 2011 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.29* 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* -0.25* 1.00 
NOTE: Pearson correlation coefficients are above the diagonal (shown in bold). Spearman correlation coefficients are below the diagonal. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).       * Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5. Regression Models  
Independent variables Hypothesis 
Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 
(robust) 
Model 2 
(robust) 
Model 3 
(robust) 
Model 4 
(robust) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
(Constant)  
 
 
  
0.565*** 
(6.45) 
0.036 
(0.13) 
-1.031** 
(-2.72) 
-1.095* 
(-2.60) 
Board size (log) H1a + 
0.038 
(1.29) 
0.446* 
(2.14) 
1.055*** 
(3.93) 
1.093*** 
(3. 72) 
Board size2 (log) H1b -  
-0.077† 
(-1.89) 
-0.204*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.212*** 
(-3. 77) 
Independent directors  H2 ? 
-0.071 
(-1.16) 
-0.087 
(-1.43) 
-0.148* 
(-2.22) 
-0.151* 
(-2. 18) 
Board Activity (log) H3 + 
0.033* 
(2.41) 
0.036* 
(2.54) 
0.029† 
(1.91) 
0.030† 
(1.79) 
CEO duality  H4 - 
-0.035 
(-1.63) 
-0.037† 
(-1.72) 
-0.035 
(-1.64) 
-0.036 
(-1. 64) 
Gender H5 + 
0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.027 
(-0.31) 
-0.049 
(-0.56) 
-0.053 
(-0. 58) 
Latin Corporate Governance Model H6 + 
0.022 
(0.94) 
0.020 
(0.83) 
0.018 
(0.81) 
0.017 
(0.72) 
Dual Corporate Governance Model H6 + 
0.024 
(0.92) 
0.024 
(0.88) 
0.120* 
(2.23) 
0.127* 
(2.25) 
Size (log)  +   
0.024* 
(2.17) 
0.026* 
(2. 14) 
Industry  +   
0.058** 
(2.96) 
0.060** 
(2. 87) 
Listing on sustainability indexes  +   
0.088*** 
(3.82) 
0.091*** 
(3. 60) 
Ownership concentration   -   
0.210 
(1.67) 
0.231† 
(1.70) 
2008      
-0.014 
(-0.70) 
2009      
-0.010 
(-0.41) 
2010      
-0.014 
(-0.57) 
2011  
 
     
-0.010 
(-0.36) 
N   75 75 75 75 
R-squared   0.236 0.260 0.426 0.430 
Durbin-Watson   2.269 2.216 2.253 2.252 
F test 
(p-value) 
  
5.331*** 
(0.000) 
5.23*** 
(0.000) 
5.555*** 
(0.000) 
4.021*** 
(0.000) 
Ramsey Reset test 
(p-value) 
   
0.09 
(0.967) 
0.58 
(0.629) 
0.69 
(0.564) 
0.75                
(0.526) 
NOTE: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001   
Model 1:  Pooled OLS (Indep. variables). Model 2: Pooled OLS (Indep. variables with board size and board size squared). Model 3: Pooled 
OLS (Indep. Variables, with board size and board size squared, and control variables). Model 4: Pooled OLS (Indep. Variables, with board 
size and board size squared, control variables and time-effect). 
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 Table 6. Regression Model 4 for sub-indexes 
Independent variables Hypothesis 
Predicte
d sign 
Strategy 
(robust) 
Processes 
(robust) 
Innovatio
n (robust) 
Technology 
(robust) 
Customers 
(robust) 
Human 
Capital 
(robust) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
b 
(t) 
(Constant)  
 
 
  
0.587 
(1.22) 
-1.718† 
(-1.75) 
-4.912** 
(-3.17) 
-0.303 
(-0.27) 
-1.391* 
(-2.01) 
-1.096* 
(-2.06) 
Board size (log) H1a + 
0.004 
(0.01) 
1.830** 
(2.98) 
3.281** 
(3.18) 
-0.108 
(-0.13) 
0.726 
(1.48) 
1.446*** 
(3.94) 
Board size2 (log) H1b - 
-0.006 
(-0.08) 
-0.378** 
(-3.24) 
-0.611** 
(-3.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.153 
(-1.64) 
-0.267*** 
(-3.86) 
Independent directors H2 ? 
-0.061 
(-0.85) 
-0.078 
(-0.61) 
-0.799** 
(-3.38) 
0.275* 
(2.02) 
-0.092 
(-0.87) 
-0.169* 
(-2.09) 
Board Activity (log) H3 + 
0.031† 
(1.91) 
0.030 
(0.95) 
0.141* 
(2.47) 
-0.008 
(-0.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.019 
(0.97) 
CEO duality  H4 - 
-0.050† 
(-1.93) 
-0.076 
(-1.65) 
-0.047 
(-0.59) 
0.050 
(1.04) 
-0.098* 
(-2.62) 
0.007 
(0.27) 
Gender H5 + 
-0.012 
(-0.1) 
-0.427* 
(-2.42) 
0.236 
(0.77) 
0.469** 
(2.84) 
-0.357* 
(-2.59) 
0.023 
(0.2) 
Latin Corporate 
Governance Model 
H6 + 
0.051* 
(2.23) 
-0.059 
(-1.57) 
0.062 
(0.85) 
0.067 
(1.47) 
0.092** 
(2.68) 
-0.040 
(-1.46) 
Dual Corporate 
Governance Model 
H6 + 
0.057 
(1.02) 
0.047 
(0.46) 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
0.355** 
(3.07) 
0.411*** 
(5.08) 
0.066 
(1.23) 
Size (log)  + 
0.023* 
(2.00) 
0.018 
(0.76) 
0.089* 
(2.18) 
0.052** 
(2.01) 
0.065** 
(3.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.92) 
Industry  + 
0.006 
(0.27) 
0.118** 
(3.24) 
-0.121 
(-1.62) 
0.229*** 
(5.78) 
0.191*** 
(5.33) 
0.040† 
(1.73) 
Listing on sustainability 
indexes 
 + 
0.006 
(0.21) 
0.107† 
(1.99) 
0.286** 
(3.35) 
0.186** 
(2.69) 
0.126** 
(3.35) 
0.062** 
(2.73) 
Ownership concentration   - 
0.121 
(0.81) 
0.221 
(0.89) 
0.194 
(0.39) 
0.672* 
(2.62) 
0.694** 
(3.46) 
0.028 
(0.21) 
2008   
0.007 
(0.33) 
0.022 
(0.51) 
-0.102 
(-1.27) 
0.030 
(0.53) 
-0.038 
(-1.14) 
-0.015 
(-0.54) 
2009   
-0.029 
(-1.19) 
0.011 
(0.24) 
-0.067 
(-0.79) 
0.026 
(0.43) 
-0.031 
(-0.86) 
0.018 
(0.59) 
2010   
-0.014 
(-0.58) 
0.031 
(0.6) 
-0.101 
(-1.13) 
0.009 
(0.14) 
-0.033 
(-0.87) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
2011  
 
  
-0.010 
(-0.31) 
0.048 
(0.87) 
-0.096 
(-1.04) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.041 
(-0.95) 
0.006 
(0.16) 
N   75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared   0.393 0.288 0.499 0.459 0.661 0.550 
Durbin-Watson   1.79 2.335 2.115 1.839 2.122 2.156 
F test 
(p-value) 
  3.30*** 2.16* 4.66*** 7.28*** 8.23*** 5.24*** 
Ramsey Reset test 
(p-value) 
   
0.72 
(0.544) 
0.46 
(0.709) 
5.82 
(0.002) 
11.88 
(0.000) 
5.88 
(0.001) 
0.24 
(0.865) 
NOTE: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001   
Model 4: Pooled OLS (Indep. Variables, with board size and board size squared, control variables and time-effect). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 38 
 
Appendix. Sample companies and industry 
Banif –Banco Internacional do Funchal Financial 
BCP – Banco Comercial Português Financial 
BES –Banco Espírito Santo Financial 
BPI – Banco Português de Investimento Financial 
Brisa Industrials 
Cimpor Industrials 
EDP Utilities  
Galp Oil &Gas 
J. Martins Consumer Services 
M.Engil Industrials 
Portucel Basic materials 
PT-Telecom Telecommunications 
REN Utilities 
Sonae Consumer Services 
Sonaecom Telecommunications 
 
 
 
